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End-to-end security protocols, like Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [1], enable the 
establishment of mutually authenticated confidential channels between edge nodes and the 
cloud, even in the presence of untrusted and potentially malicious network infrastructure. 
While this makes DTLS an ideal solution for IoT, the associated computational cost makes 
software-only implementations prohibitively expensive for resource-constrained embedded 
devices. We address this challenge through three key contributions: reconfigurable 
cryptographic accelerators enable two orders of magnitude energy savings, a dedicated DTLS 
engine offloads control flow to hardware reducing program code and memory usage by ~10x, 
and an on-chip RISC-V core exercises the flexibility of the cryptographic accelerators to 
demonstrate security applications beyond DTLS. 
 
 
Fig. 1: End-to-end security for IoT – challenges and proposed solutions. 
 
Fig. 1 summarizes the two major phases of the DTLS protocol: handshake and application data. 
The handshake phase consists of four steps. In the first step, the client (edge node) and the 
server agree upon protocol parameters such as the cryptographic algorithms to be used. Next, 
a Diffie-Hellman key exchange is performed to establish a shared secret over the untrusted 
channel. Following this, the client and the server authenticate each other through digital 
certificate verification. Finally, the two parties verify the integrity of the information 
exchanged in the above steps, to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. At this point, a mutually 
authenticated confidential channel has been established between the client and the server, 
which can then be used in the second phase to exchange encrypted application data. We 
accelerate both phases of the DTLS protocol in hardware. 
 
 
Fig. 2: System diagram with supported server authentication modes and DTLS computation details. 
 
Fig. 2 shows the system block diagram, the DTLS modes we support, and details of the 
computations required to implement these modes. Our system consists of a 3-stage RISC-V 
processor [2] supporting the RV32I instruction set, with a 16KB instruction cache and a 64KB 
data memory. An SD card is used as the backing store for larger programs. A memory-mapped 
DTLS engine (DE), comprised of a protocol controller, a dedicated 2 KB RAM, and AES-128 
GCM, SHA-256 and prime curve elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) primitives, accelerates the 
DTLS protocol. Sleep mode is implemented on the RISC-V, to save power, by gating its clock 
when cryptographic tasks are delegated to the DE. The DE uses a dedicated hardware interrupt 
to wake the processor on completion of these tasks. The DE is clocked by a software-controlled 
divider to decouple the processor operating frequency from the long critical paths in the ECC 
accelerator. In addition to full verification of the server certificate in step three of the handshake 
phase, the DE also supports caching of server certificate information to speed up future 
handshakes. This cached mode reduces an ECDSA-Verify operation to gain 1.56x savings in 
handshake energy. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Proposed prime field elliptic curve cryptography accelerator and energy savings. 
 
Even in the cached mode, ECC computations, such as ECDHE and ECDSA, account for over 
99% of the DTLS handshake energy. Fig. 3 describes an energy-efficient ECC accelerator that 
reduces this overhead. A pre-computation-based comb algorithm [3] is used for elliptic curve 
scalar multiplication (ECSM), and a 4KB cache can store pre-computed comb data for up to 
six points, including generator points and public keys, thus reducing ECSM energy by 2.5x 
compared to a baseline implementation. A 256-bit wide interleaved reduction-based modular 
multiplier is implemented to support all Weierstrass and Montgomery curves over prime fields 
up to 256 bits, with higher bits of the data-path gated when working with smaller primes. The 
use of interleaved reduction allows us to handle arbitrary primes without any special structure, 
enabling support for NIST, SEC and ANSI curves. Resource-constrained ECC 
implementations [4,5] typically use projective coordinates to avoid modular inversion in the 
ECSM inner loop, at the cost of extra multiplications and a final expensive Fermat inversion. 
This work implements a dedicated 31k-gate modular inverter, allowing the use of affine 
coordinates, which saves 1.93x in ECSM energy by trading off the extra multiplications for 
cheaper Euclid inversions. Furthermore, a zero-less signed digit representation [3] of the scalar 
k is used to prevent simple power analysis side-channel attacks on the ECSM. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Architecture of the DTLS Engine with resource utilization improvements  
over software-only and software-plus-hardware implementations. 
 
Fig. 4 shows the detailed architecture of the DTLS engine and a comparison of resource 
utilization in three scenarios: DTLS fully implemented as RISC-V software (SW), the 
cryptographic kernels accelerated in hardware and only the DTLS controller implemented in 
software (SW+HW), and DTLS fully implemented in hardware (HW). Three blocks in the DE, 
that result in resource utilization improvement, are highlighted in Fig. 4. The use of 
cryptographic accelerators alone results in over 2 orders of magnitude improvement in run time 
and energy efficiency (SW vs. SW+HW). Similarly, the elimination of ECC code reduces 
instruction cache thrashing by 70x. Next, the DTLS controller implements a micro-coded state 
machine for packet framing, computation of the session transcript, parsing and validation of 
X.509 digital certificates and HMAC-DRBG-based pseudo-random number generation. This 
reduces code size by ~60KB and instruction cache misses by 60x (SW+HW vs. HW). Finally, 
the DTLS RAM implements a micro stack for storing temporary variables computed during 
the DTLS handshake. This 1.25KB micro stack results in 13KB reduction in data memory 
usage on the RISC-V (SW+HW vs. HW). 
 
Fig. 5: Flexibility of the DTLS Engine with reconfigurable ECC and application benchmarks. 
 
Fig. 5 demonstrates the reconfigurability of the DE. The ECC primitive in the DE can 
accelerate all prime curves up to 256 bits. ECSM energies and run times as a function of prime 
bit-width, using the secp160r1, secp192r1, secp224r1 and secp256r1 curves, are shown in Fig. 
5. Security applications beyond DTLS can be implemented on the RISC-V, using the 
cryptographic accelerators in standalone mode. We illustrate this flexibility using three 
benchmark applications: (a) ECMQV, an alternative to ECDHE+ECDSA-based authenticated 
key exchange, (b) Schnorr Prover, an interactive zero-knowledge prover of identity, and (c) 
Merkle Hashing, used to ensure data integrity in peer-to-peer network protocols. The reduction 
in resource utilization for all three applications is shown in Fig. 5. The ECC-based applications 
experience over 200x increase in energy efficiency, while Merkle hashing sees 6x energy 
savings. 
 
 
Fig. 6: Comparison with integrated cryptographic accelerators for embedded systems. 
 
Fig. 6 compares this work with embedded systems that integrate multiple cryptographic 
accelerators. This work implements a flexible ECC accelerator which supports arbitrary primes 
up to 256 bits, in contrast with [4] and [5] which only support fixed 192 and 255-bit curves 
respectively. [6] only supports binary field modular multiplication in hardware. Our ECC 
accelerator is 458x and 9x more energy-efficient than [4] and [5] respectively at comparable 
security levels. In addition to the resource savings enabled by the individual cryptographic 
accelerators, offloading DTLS control flow to the DE realizes a further 3x reduction in energy 
and 5x reduction in run time. 
 
 
Fig. 7: Chip micrograph and performance summary. 
 
The chip was fabricated in a 65nm LP CMOS process, occupies 2.4mm2 active area, and 
supports voltage scaling from 1.2V down to 0.8V. All measurements for the RISC-V and the 
DE are reported at 16MHz and 0.8V. The RISC-V processor occupies 34k NAND Gate 
Equivalents (GE), and achieves 0.96 DMIPS/MHz when consuming 40.36 µW/MHz. The 
DTLS engine occupies 149k GE and uses 6.75KB of SRAM. The DE consumes 44.08 µJ per 
DTLS handshake, and 0.89 nJ per byte of application data. Therefore, through the design of 
reconfigurable energy-efficient cryptographic accelerators and a dedicated protocol controller, 
this work makes DTLS a practical solution for implementing end-to-end security on resource-
constrained IoT devices. 
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